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Since early January 2016 Jinja Honchō has participated in a campaign led 
by Nippon Kaigi to establish popular support for constitutional reform. In 
this essay, I seek to understand Jinja Honchō’s involvement in this campaign 
through a reading of the postwar Supreme Court cases related to the 
separation of religion from the state. I argue that amendment of Articles 
20 and 89 was never considered a priority for most of this period, since the 
prevalent paradigm in the Supreme Court was that Shinto was something 
other than a religion; but following the break with this paradigm in the 
Ehime Tamagushiryō case in 1997, and the subsequent confirmation of the 
validity of this precedent through the ruling on the Sunagawa I case in 2010, 
those seeking a closer relationship between the Shinto establishment and the 
state have had to find new routes. The rise of Nippon Kaigi as one of Japan’s 
largest conservative lobby groups coincides with this development in the 
Supreme Court, and the organization’s focus on constitutional reform can 
therefore partly be understood in this light. Should Nippon Kaigi eventually 
produce a draft for their vision of a new constitution, it is likely that the idea 
of Shinto as something other than a religion will be reflected in this draft.
Keywords: Shinto, Supreme Court of Japan, Nippon Kaigi, Jinja Honchō, 
Japanese secularism, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), constitutional reform
Petitioning for Constitutional Reform: Why Religion Matters
When people in Japan flocked to their local shrines for their first visits of the New Year in 
early January 2016, many were surprised to find there a petition for constitutional reform. 
On large white banners decorated with orange cherry blossoms, under the heading “aim 
for a proud Japan” (hokori aru Nippon o mezashite 誇りある日本をめざして), visitors were 
encouraged to offer their support for the project of amending Japan’s postwar constitution. 
Although the banners were signed Jinjachō 神社庁 (local branch of the Jinja Honchō 神社
本庁, the Association of Shinto Shrines), the campaign—Kenpō kaisei o jitsugen suru 1000 
mannin nettowāku 憲法改正を実現する1000万人ネットワーク (Network of 10 million people 
to realize constitutional reform, henceforth “Kenpō1000”)—was in fact run by Utsukushii 
Nippon no Kenpō o Tsukuru Kokumin no Kai 美しい日本の憲法をつくる国民の会 (Citizens’ 
Association for the Creation of a Constitution for a Beautiful Japan), a Nippon Kaigi 
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日本会議 workgroup for constitutional reform.1 
Considering the fact that a number of prominent 
of f icia ls from Jinja Honchō hold leadership 
positions in Nippon Kaigi, it is hardly surprising 
that this association would also participate in a 
campaign sponsored by Nippon Kaigi, but it does 
serve as an inroad to a broader question about the 
postwar secular order in Japan.2 Why would Jinja 
Honchō invest in the question of constitutional 
reform? What does Jinja Honchō have to gain from 
participating in this project? Why is this happening 
in 2016?
One key to answering these questions can be 
found in the debates about state-religion relations 
in postwar Japan. Through the Directive for the 
Disestablishment of State Shinto, issued by the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) 
on 15 December 1945, “State Shinto”—defined in 
the document as “that branch of Shinto which by 
official acts of the Japanese Government has been 
differentiated from the religion of Shrine Shinto 
and has been classified as a nonreligious national cult”—was disestablished and replaced 
solely by “Shrine Shinto (jinja shintō 神社神道),” which would be “recognized as a religion 
if its adherents so desire and will be granted the same protection as any other religion in so 
far as it may in fact be the philosophy or religion of Japanese individuals.” 3 Through this 
distinction, the form of Shinto which had previously been defined by the Japanese state in 
terms of ideology and which had been excluded from the legal category of religion from the 
Meiji period and up until the end of the war, was disestablished and replaced by (Shrine) 
Shinto, a religion. After 1945 much of what had previously been included in the national 
ideology of “State Shinto,” described by Isomae Jun’ichi as “an ambiguous system, clearly 
classifiable as neither ‘religion’ nor ‘secular,’ born out of trial and error and adopted as a 
means by the native elite in Japan to unify the people,” came to be considered aspects of 
one religion, with the same legal rights and privileges as other religions enjoyed.4 Major 
institutions that had enjoyed substantial patronage from the state throughout the modern 
period, including the shrine complex at Ise and Meiji Shrine in Tokyo, had their official ties 
to the state cut and were forced to find new ways of surviving without public support.
Jinja Honchō was established as a response to the forced disestablishment of Shinto. 
Originally founded in 1946, following the promulgation of the Religious Juridical 
1 Kenpō1000 2016. For details on the organization, see also Tsukada 2015, pp. 57–67.
2 According to the Nippon Kaigi homepage, Jinja Honchō leaders currently acting as officials in the organization 
include Takatsukasa Naotake 鷹司尚武, chief priest of the Ise Shrines, Kitashirakawa Michihisa 北白川道久, 
representative (tōri 統理) of Jinja Honchō, and Hattori Sadahiro 服部貞弘, chairman of the Shinto Association 
of Spiritual Leadership (Shintō Seiji Renmei 神道政治連盟). Nippon Kaigi 2016a.
3 The Shinto Directive 1945.
4 Isomae 2007, pp. 93–102.
Figure 1. Banners calling for constitutional 
reform, under the heading “aim for a proud 
Japan.” The banners in this picture were seen 
in June 2016 at the Akasaka Hikawa Shrine 
赤坂氷川神社 in Tokyo. Photo by the author.
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Persons Act (shūkyō hōjin hō 宗教法人法) in April 1951, Jinja Honchō was registered as a 
Comprehensive Religious Juridical Person (hōkatsu shūkyō hōjin 包括宗教法人).5 Acting 
as an umbrella organization for around 80,000 of Japan’s shrines, the organization was 
intended to maintain Shinto institutions across the country after state patronage had 
been cut, but it also resulted in a new form of institutionalized Shinto centered on the 
Ise Shrines. Although the Ise Shrines, like all other shrines, were registered as a Religious 
Juridical Person, under Jinja Honchō they enjoyed the position of primi inter pares as the 
honsō 本宗—“supreme sanctuary”—of Japan.6 Jinja Honchō is also a central actor tied 
to what John Breen and Mark Teeuwen in various publications have referred to as “the 
Shinto establishment.” 7 The Shinto establishment can be used to describe a number of 
“self-consciously ‘Shinto’” actors devoted to the idea that Shinto is a vital part of Japanese 
identity. Reproducing a view of Shinto based in the state-sanctioned Shinto of the prewar 
era, many of the actors connected to the Shinto establishment also have a high degree of 
interest in reinstating state sponsorship of key Shinto institutions, in particular the Ise 
Shrines and Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. According to Breen and Teeuwen, the Shinto 
establishment lays claim to “some 110 million Shinto practitioners,” yet it is uncertain to 
what extent the often nationalistic agenda of this establishment is actually supported by 
those ordinary people in Japan who worship at shrines.8
One key issue of constitutional reform where Jinja Honchō is involved regards Articles 
20 and 89, the two articles that together establish the legal framework for the postwar 
secular order in Japan. Written with the specific purpose of raising a wall of separation 
between religion and the state, and thus preventing a return to Shinto as the national 
ideology of the Japanese state, Paragraph 3 of Article 20 establishes that “the State and its 
organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.” 9 Although the 
question of how Articles 20 and 89 have been interpreted throughout the postwar period 
has been explored by numerous scholars, this essay will offer a condensed analysis of key 
legal cases in order to better illustrate those legal developments that have contributed to the 
active participation of Jinja Honchō in the current attempts at constitutional reform.10 The 
focus of this analysis will be on discourses of religion and Shinto and how these concepts are 
used in court, and what the consequences are for the relationship between state and religion 
in postwar Japan. As has been argued by Winnifred Sullivan, disestablishment and freedom 
of religion require clearly distinguishable categories of religion in order to work, but at 
 5 Although the Religious Juridical Persons Act was established following the enactment of the postwar 
constitution, it built on the Shūkyō hōjin rei 宗教法人令 of 28 December 1945. Under this directive, Jinja 
Honchō was registered as a Religious Juridical Person in 1946.
 6 Teeuwen and Breen 2017, p. 214.
 7 Although Breen and Teeuwen have used a number of different definitions for the Shinto establishment in 
earlier publications (c.f. Breen and Teeuwen 2009, 2010, or Breen 2010), in their latest work they define 
it, within the specific context of the Ise Shrines, as a set of three “distinct but related agents”: The priest 
administrators of the Ise Shrines, the functionaries of Jinja Honchō, and the members of the Ise Supporters’ 
Association (Ise Jingū shikinen sengū 伊勢神宮式年遷宮). See also Teeuwen and Breen 2017, p. 211.
 8 Breen and Teeuwen 2009, pp. 1–3.
 9 For a more detailed account of the process of disestablishment in the new constitution, see Dower 2000. For 
a contrasting view further emphasizing the Japanese contribution to the process, see Beer and Maki 2002. 
10 See for instance Forfar 2003; Takahata 2007; Van Winkle 2012; Ravitch 2014.
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the same time the courts play a key role in establishing normative understandings of these 
categories.11
Before we turn our attention to the question of how the Supreme Court has argued 
with regards to the categories of Shinto and religion, we must first clarify these categories 
in a Japanese context. Regardless of whether the idea that the world can be divided into a 
religious and a secular sphere existed in Japan before the encounter with Western modernity, 
the Japanese term shūkyō 宗教 was not agreed upon as the equivalent of the Western concept 
of religion until the latter half of the nineteenth century.12 At the same time, the adoption 
of the term shūkyō was not simply a matter of importing a foreign idea. As Jason Josephson 
has argued, the category of religion in Japan was produced through a process of negotiation 
by Japanese intellectuals, policymakers, and leaders, which resulted in the idea of religion 
as the negotiated middle ground between the secular/the real and superstition/delusion. 
This process resulted in a number of “religions,” but it also resulted in the conceptualization 
of certain forms of Shinto as “secular,” and hence was excluded from the legal category of 
religion.13 Thus despite the fact that the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1890) had 
a provision for “freedom to believe in religion” (shinkyō no jiyū 信教の自由), this was still 
conditioned by adherence to the official ideology of the state. Imperial subjects were free to 
believe in religions—or teachings (kyō 教)—but they also had to adhere to the secular order 
of the state, which included many elements of Shinto.
Since Kuroda Toshio in his 1981 article “Shinto in the History of Japanese Religion” 
began questioning the paradigm of Shinto as the ancient and native—sometimes referred 
to as racial—religion of Japan, arguing that Shinto through much of Japanese history 
should rather be seen as an aspect of kenmitsu 顕密 Buddhism, a critical school of Shinto 
studies has gained much ground in academic circles.14 Through the work of scholars 
like Helen Hardacre (1991), Mark Teeuwen (2002), Shimazono Susumu (2005, 2010), 
and Isomae Jun’ichi (2007, 2012), the genealogy of Shinto in Japanese history has been 
further explored. Parallel to this development has been the rise of critical religion theory, 
headed by scholars including Russell T. McCutcheon, Talal Asad, and Timothy Fitzgerald. 
Arguing that the categories of religion and the secular are closely connected to the process 
of Western modernity, scholars within this tradition suggest that the uncritical application 
of these concepts—indicating a binary view of society as easily divided into two spheres—
to a non-European context is highly problematic. Rather than assuming normative 
understandings of what religion is and is not, critical religion seeks to establish contextually 
founded genealogies of these concepts. As Asad has put it, “the secular is neither singular 
in origin nor stable in its historical identity, although it works through a series of particular 
oppositions.” 15
11 Sullivan 2005.
12 See for instance Christoph Kleine’s criticism of critical religion theory in Kleine 2013.
13 Josephson 2012, pp. 251–62.
14 For instance, Ono Sokyō of Kokugakuin University wrote in an English-language monograph on Shinto that 
is still widely available: “Shinto is a racial religion. It is inextricably interwoven with the fabric of Japanese 
customs and ways of thinking. It is impossible to separate it from the communal and national life of the 
people. Among the kami of Shrine Shinto many have a special claim to worship from the Japanese people 
alone and are not such as can be venerated by the peoples of the world in the sense that the Japanese people 
do” (Ono 2004, p. 111).
15 Asad 2003, p. 25.
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In her study, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Winnifred Sullivan uses critical 
religion theory to problematize legal discourses on religion in the United States. In her 
view, the major problem with laws regulating religion—regardless of whether they concern 
freedom of religion or the relationship between religion and state—is that they require 
stable and essentialized religion. The problem is that religion is an unstable category.16 
Asad has argued along the same lines: “The nation-state requires clearly demarcated spaces 
that it can classify and regulate,” and yet “the space that religion may properly occupy 
in society has to be continually redefined by the law because the reproduction of secular 
life within and beyond the nation-state continually affects the discursive clarity of that 
space.” 17 Disestablishment requires the category of religion, but the category can never be 
essentialized beyond the normative viewpoint of those seeking to define it. In a Japanese 
context, where religion is part of the vocabulary of the constitution, it falls on the individual 
justices of the Supreme Court to define and interpret legally which acts are restricted under 
Articles 20 and 89 of the constitution. Before moving on to the subject of constitutional 
reform, it is therefore essential to understand what interpretations the Supreme Court has so 
far produced on the subject of Shinto and religion.
1952–1997: Defining Shinto and Religion in Court
Although it was not the first Supreme Court ruling to involve Articles 20 and 89, the 
1977 ruling in the Tsu groundbreaking case was to set a precedent with regards to the 
separation of religion and state in Japan.18 The case concerned a groundbreaking ceremony 
(kikōshiki 起工式) in January 1965 at the site of a new public gymnasium in the city of Tsu 
in Mie Prefecture. Commissioned by the local city council, the ceremony was officiated 
by priests from the local Ōichi Shrine 大市神社 and their fees (¥4000) as well as the 
offerings (kumotsuryō 供物料) made by members of the city council (¥3663) were paid from 
public funds.19 The original complaint was brought by Sekiguchi Sei’ichi 関口精一, a city 
counselor who, together with more than a hundred other local officials, had participated 
in the ceremony. Sekiguchi, born in 1915 and a survivor of the war, was a member of the 
Japanese Communist Party, which throughout the postwar period has remained strongly 
opposed to renewed ties between the state and religion. In his lawsuit, Sekiguchi argued that 
using public funds for the groundbreaking ceremony not only violated the ban in Article 89 
against state support for religious organizations, but that it was also a clear violation of the 
Article 20 ban against “religious activities.”
16 Sullivan 2005.
17 Asad 2003, p. 201.
18 The first time the Supreme Court produced a ruling concerning Article 20 was on 5 May 1963, when the 
Shōwa 36 (a) 485 was resolved. The case concerned a female priest who during an exorcism on a mentally ill 
girl caused her patient to suffer a fatal heart attack. This became a leading ruling with regards to freedom of 
religion, but since the case is not of immediate concern for the current discussion, I will not discuss it further 
here. For a brief discussion of rulings on religious accommodation in Japan, see Takahata 2007. It should 
also be noted that Japan does not hold precedents to be legally binding and that each court is at liberty to 
independently interpret the text of the constitution in order to solve a dispute. However, Supreme Court 
rulings still hold a “tremendous amount of influence” over the lower courts, and it is in fact rare for lower 
courts to disregard a clear Supreme Court precedent. See Matsui 2011, pp. 22–24.
19 Shōwa 46 (gyō-tsu) 69, p. 2; all court cases are listed at the end of the references.
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In the first instance ruling, pre sented 
in Tsu District Court, the court ruled 
against the plaintiff, arguing that while 
to the outside viewer the groundbreak-
ing ceremony might appear to be a 
“religious event” (shūkyōteki gyōji 宗教
的行事), it was in fact a “secular event” 
(sezokuteki gyōji 世俗的行事) devoid 
of religious purpose, and was therefore 
allowed under Article 20. The court 
also claimed that the compensation 
paid to the shrine priests was too low 
to carry any real meaning, and that it 
was therefore not in violation of Article 
89. The second instance court did not 
share this view, and in their 1971 ruling 
they argued that the groundbreaking 
ceremony did surpass the limits of 
“simple social ritual (shakaiteki girei 
社会的儀礼) or secular event” and that 
it should be viewed as a “religious cer-
emony characteristic of Shrine Shinto.” 
According to the court, the purpose of 
the postwar constitution was to enforce 
the “nonreligious nature” (hishūkyōsei 
非宗教性) of the Japanese state, and 
therefore the ceremony—as conducted 
by shrine priests—was a clear violation 
of this principle and should be viewed 
as unconstitutional under Articles 20 
and 89.20
The Supreme Court reversed the second instance ruling, arguing that although the 
state has to remain “religiously neutral,” a “total separation of religion from the state is 
in practice close to impossible” and the state may therefore still maintain some degree 
of connection with religion.21 Although this reasoning might seem contradictory to the 
phrasing in the constitution, which states that the state must “refrain” (shite wa naranai 
してはならない) from religious activities, the justices might simply have been attempting 
to establish a workable relationship between political and religious actors in Japan. As has 
been argued by Andrew B. Van Winkle, a hardline interpretation of Article 20 forcing the 
complete separation of religion and state would also necessitate a “repeal of the Religious 
20 Shōwa 46 (gyō-tsu) 69, p. 2.
21 Shōwa 46 (gyō-tsu) 69, pp. 5–6.
Figure 2. Entrance to Ōichi Shrine in Tsu City. In January 1965, 
four priests from this shrine conducted the groundbreaking 
rites at the sites of the new public gymnasium. Photo by the 
author.
Figure 3. The Tsu City public gymnasium. Photo by the 
author.
Jinja Honchō and the Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan
233
Juridical Persons Law, because the Law contains numerous privileges conferred by the state 
on religions.” 22
Based on the majority view that a complete separation of religion from the state is 
impossible, the ruling in the Tsu groundbreaking case also established a “purpose and 
effect” standard (mokuteki kōka kijun 目的効果基準) which has been used in all subsequent 
cases concerning Articles 20 and 89. In short, the standard aims to decide “whether the 
government purpose behind the challenged conduct was to advance religion or whether 
it had that effect.” 23 The court argued that the phrasing “religious activity” should not be 
understood as including “all activities by the state and its organs which bring them into 
contact with religion,” but rather those activities that exceed certain limits. These limits 
include the promotion and subsidizing of specific religions, or any attempt at “oppression or 
interference.” Consequently, when deciding whether an act constitutes a proscribed “religious 
activity,” it is not enough for it to be officiated by a religious professional. Rather, 
the place of the activity, the religious evaluation of common people with regards to the 
activity, the actor’s intent and purpose with the activity as well as whether and to what 
degree there exists a religious consciousness, and the effect and influence on common 
people, are all circumstances that should be considered to reach an objective judgment 
based on socially accepted ideas.24
Besides clarifying the position of the state as religiously neutral, the Supreme Court also 
argued that “for the people of our country, many citizens believe in Shinto as members 
of a local community, and in Buddhism as individuals.” Despite this, they also agreed 
that in general people in Japan do not have a very high “degree of religious interest” 
(shūkyōteki kanshindo 宗教的関心度). This apparent contradiction was solved by suggesting 
that Japanese religiosity, in particular with regards to Shrine Shinto, was different from 
other forms of religiosity in that it was more focused on ritual (saishi girei 祭祀儀礼) than 
on “international activities such as active propagation and missionary work.” In their 
conclusion, the justices conceded that the groundbreaking ceremony was “conducted 
by priests who were religious specialists, wearing prescribed garments, in a ceremony 
conforming to Shrine Shinto” and this made it “impossible to deny that it has a connection 
to religion.” However, despite the fact that the “groundbreaking ceremony is a ceremony 
with a religious source in a festival to pacify the kami of the land,” common people do not 
perceive the ceremony as having a “religious meaning” (shūkyōteki igi 宗教的意義). Rather, 
to people in general a groundbreaking ceremony is “a completely secular ritual conducted in 
accordance with general social customs.” 25
Through their use of the views of common people as an objective measure for 
the nature of Shinto, the justices rely on the assumption that the views they present 
correspond to the conventions through which people interact linguistically; that is, when 
Japanese people in general speak of Shinto, they do not understand it to be a religion. 
22 Van Winkle 2012, p. 381. 
23 Kobayashi 2005, p. 698.
24 Shōwa 46 (gyō-tsu) 69, p. 6.
25 Shōwa 46 (gyō-tsu) 69, p. 9.
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Norman Fairclough has referred to such assumptions as ideologies, defined as “a means of 
legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence 
of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences 
for granted.” 26 The assumption that most Japanese people do not consider Shinto to be 
a religion is the essence of the ideology of Shinto as something beyond the discourse of 
religion, as something connected to the Japanese ethnos in a way that religions are not. This 
ideology is what I refer to as the “Shinto normative,” the idea that to be Japanese is also to 
be Shinto.
The paradigm of the Shinto normative came to dominate in Supreme Court rulings 
on the separation of religion and state for two decades after the Tsu ruling. The first ruling 
to use this case as a precedent was the June 1988 ruling on the SDF enshrinement case. The 
case concerned the enshrinement in Yamaguchi Prefecture’s Gokoku Shrine (gokoku jinja 
護国神社) of the spirit of Nakaya Takafumi 中谷孝文, an officer in the Japan Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) who died in an accident while on duty.27 The enshrinement (chinzasai 鎮座祭), 
which was carried out as a joint ceremony enshrining the spirits of a total of twenty-seven 
service members of the SDF from Yamaguchi Prefecture between 19 and 20 April 1972, was 
administered by the Yamaguchi branch of the SDF Friendship Association (Taiyūkai 隊友会) 
in accordance with the wishes of Nakaya’s father. The controversy arose because while 
Nakaya himself had not been religious, his wife Nakaya Yasuko 中谷康子 was a Protestant 
Christian belonging to the United Church of Christ in Japan (Nihon Kirisuto Kyōdan 日本
基督教団).28 Following her husband’s death, Yasuko attempted to stop the enshrinement 
ceremony from taking place, but failing to do so she eventually filed a lawsuit against the 
SDF Friendship Association and the local liaison office of the SDF.29
Both rulings in the SDF enshrinement case concluded that enshrinement at the 
Gokoku Shrine carried a “fundamentally religious meaning,” and that the actions taken 
by the SDF Friendship Association therefore constituted a crime against the constitutional 
guarantee on the freedom of religious belief and hence infringed upon Nakaya Yasuko’s 
personal religious rights.30 However, through a strict reading of the Tsu precedent the 
Supreme Court completely overturned this ruling, arguing that the enshrinement ceremony 
would not be restricted by Article 20, because the purpose of the ceremony was not to 
promote religion but to “increase the social position and to raise the morale of the SDF 
servicemen.” Furthermore, the court argued that Article 20 “does not directly guarantee 
freedom of religion itself to individuals, but rather it is an attempt to indirectly guarantee 
26 Fairclough 2001, p. 2.
27 A Gokoku shrine is a shrine that before the Allied occupation of Japan served as a sort of “branch shrine” 
to Yasukuni Shrine. Although many of these shrines originated in the Meiji Restoration, they were not 
designated as Gokoku (“nation-protecting”) shrines before 1939. The establishment of such shrines, as well 
as local-level shrines for the war dead (shōkonsha 招魂社) and monuments dedicated to the spirits of the war 
dead (chūkonhi 忠魂碑), was part of “a concerted and sustained effort to promote a cult of the war dead and 
historic loyalists.” (Hardacre 1991, pp. 90–93.)
28 Shōwa 57 (o) 902, pp. 1–3.
29 Based on their conversations with Mrs. Nakaya, O’Brien and Ohkoshi write the following on her motivations: 
“[She] was a Christian, a religious minority. She faced a certain uphill battle, against virtually insurmountable 
odds. Yet Mrs. Nakaya claims not to feel put upon because she is a Christian minority in Japan, for, as she 
points out, all ‘Christians don’t think alike.’ Instead, she feels set apart because she thinks differently from 
most Japanese.” (O’Brien and Ohkoshi 1996, p. 143.)
30 Shōwa 57 (o) 902, pp. 4–5.
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the freedom of religion through the guarantee on the separation of state and religion which 
sets the confines of actions which the state and its organs may not carry out.” Consequently, 
unless an act directly infringes upon a person’s constitutionally guaranteed freedom of 
religion, for instance by compelling the individual to take part in a religious service, the 
actions of the state need not be deemed unconstitutional under Article 20.31
One significant turn in the SDF enshrinement case came with regards to Nakaya 
Yasuko’s argument that the enshrinement was a violation of her personal freedom of 
religion. The court turned this argument around, claiming that it was in fact Yasuko who 
was attempting to restrict the freedom of religion enjoyed not only by her late husband, 
but also by the Gokoku Shrine where the rites were being conducted. This argument is 
partly grounded in the fifth fact established early in the ruling: “Nakaya Takafumi did 
not believe in religion during his life.” 32 The court established this position as opposed to 
the religiousness of Yasuko, who (actively) had faith in one religion (Christianity). Yasuko 
had originally kept her husband’s ashes in a small Buddhist altar (butsudan 仏壇) in her 
house, partly to appease her father-in-law, but after some reflection she removed the altar 
and instead placed her husband’s ashes in a crypt at her church, in accordance with her 
own Christian faith.33 This form of religious activity was perceived as exclusionary by the 
justices, who argued that “the guarantee of freedom of religion requires tolerance of the 
religious actions of others, whose beliefs might be inconsistent with one’s own beliefs, as 
long as they do not interfere with one’s own freedom of religion through compulsion or by 
conferring disadvantages.” As far as the justices were concerned, no one had attempted to 
coerce Yasuko to participate in any “religious events at the Gokoku Shrine,” and in turn 
they expected her to respect the enshrinement of her husband’s spirit at the Gokoku Shrine 
as protected by the shrine’s freedom of religion.34
The justices’ normative interpretation of what a religion should be like included 
tolerance (kan’yō 寛容) in order to enjoy the constitutional freedom of religion, religion 
must be inclusive and open rather than exclusionary and closed. Wendy Brown has argued 
that tolerance cannot be understood as a “transcendent and universal concept,” but should 
be seen as “a political discourse and practice of governmentality that is historically and 
geographically variable in purpose, content, agents, and objects.” Tolerance, she writes,
is exemplary of Foucault’s account of governmentality as that which organizes “the 
conduct of conduct” at a variety of sites and through rationalities not limited to those 
formally countenanced as political. Absent the precise dictates, articulations, and 
prohibitions associated with the force of law, tolerance nevertheless produces and 
positions subjects, orchestrates meanings and practices of identity, marks bodies, and 
conditions political subjectivities.35
In the SDF enshrinement case ruling, the justices in effect position a foreign, intolerant, 
and exclusionary, religion—Christianity—against the tolerance professed by the religion 
31 Shōwa 57 (o) 902, pp. 7–8.
32 Shōwa 57 (o) 902, p. 1.
33 Forfar 2003, pp. 257–58.
34 Shōwa 57 (o) 902, p. 9.
35 Brown 2006, p. 4.
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of the Gokoku Shrine. Through this ruling, a Shinto subject is produced which stands as a 
representative of the tolerant Japanese majority, pitted against the intolerance of the religious 
minority. Yet the Shinto subject is not only tolerant, it is also the norm with which other 
religions must comply, should they wish to enjoy equal freedom of religion.
The second time the Tsu precedent was used in a Supreme Court ruling was in the 
Minoo memorial case, resolved in 1993. The case was initiated through a series of suits 
filed in the mid-1970s by Kamisaka Reiko 神坂玲子 and Satoshi 哲, local citizens of the 
city of Minoo in Osaka Prefecture, against a plan by the local government to relocate the 
local chūkonhi memorial using public money, as well as providing a new location for the 
memorial free of charge. The Minoo chūkonhi was originally constructed in 1916 and was 
restored in 1950, having been taken down immediately after the war. Although it was 
originally connected to the state-sponsored cult of the war dead, since 1955 rites to console 
the spirits (ireisai 慰霊祭) have been conducted here by representatives of Shinto as well as 
Buddhist and nonreligious groups.36 The fact that Buddhist priests conducted some of these 
rites is significant, in that it makes the Minoo case the first Supreme Court case in which 
Buddhist rites fall under the category of “social ritual”—a category which otherwise appears 
to be reserved for Shinto rites.37
The justices in the Minoo case followed the Tsu precedent and used the purpose and 
effects test to reach their final conclusion: the purpose of a chūkonhi memorial was to honor 
and remember those who died in war, and therefore it was not religious. Since the group 
responsible for organizing the ireisai rites, the Nippon Izokukai 日本遺族会 (Japan War-
Bereaved Families Association), was not a religious organization, the justices concluded that 
for public officials to participate in these rites was nothing more than “a social ritual for 
the families of those who died in war” and that it could therefore not be seen as restricted 
by the constitution. Furthermore, given the secular purpose of the rites, it was reasonable 
that the mayor of the city of Minoo had used public funds.38 Through their dismissal of 
the plaintiffs’ claim that ceremonies connected to prewar state-sponsored Shinto should 
be considered religious, the justices in their ruling on the Minoo case confirmed the 
Supreme Court position that although it might at times appear religious, Shinto was in fact 
something other than religion and that it was therefore not restricted by Articles 20 and 89 
of the constitution.
The Ehime Tamagushiryō Ruling of 1997: A Change in Paradigm?
In 1997 the Supreme Court introduced a line of argument that has since come to form a 
new precedent in the legal interpretation of Articles 20 and 89. The Ehime Tamagushiryō 
case concerned the offerings paid to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo and the local Gokoku 
Shrine in Ehime Prefecture between 1981 and 1986 by members of the Ehime prefectural 
government, including Governor Shiraishi Haruki 白石春樹 and the head of the Ehime 
prefectural office in Tokyo, Nakagawa Tomotada 中川友忠. The contributions to the 
shrines included nine offerings of tamagushiryō 玉串料 at Yasukuni Shrine during the 
spring and autumn festivals, for the total sum of ¥45,000, and four separate offerings of 
36 Shōwa 62 (gyō-tsu) 148, p. 2.
37 Shōwa 62 (gyō-tsu) 148, pp. 11–12.
38 Shōwa 62 (gyō-tsu) 148, pp. 12–13.
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kentōryō 献灯料 during the Mitama Festival みたままつり in July, as well as nine offerings 
of kumotsuryō at the local Gokoku Shrine in Ehime Prefecture during festivals in spring and 
autumn dedicated to the spirits of local citizens who died in battle.39 The case was filed by 
a group of twenty-four plaintiffs headed by Anzai Kenji 安西賢二, a Shin Buddhist priest. 
Shin Buddhism has remained critical of the state sponsorship of religion—in particular 
the cult of the war dead—throughout the postwar era, from the first LDP bills on renewed 
state sponsorship for Yasukuni Shrine in the 1960s to the visits by former Prime Minister 
Koizumi Jun’ichirō 小泉純一郎 to the shrine between 2001 and 2006. During the fifteen 
years between filing the Ehime suit in 1982 and its resolution in 1997, Anzai and the other 
plaintiffs received continuous support from Shin Buddhism.40
The district court producing the first instance ruling argued that the actions of the 
Ehime prefectural government, even when seen in light of the cultural and social conditions 
of Japan, did in fact supersede the limits on state interaction with religion imposed by 
Articles 20 and 89 of the constitution. Not only was it impossible to deny the religious 
meaning of the offerings paid to the shrine, but the public funds used to pay for these 
offerings were considered substantial enough to count as “support and promotion of the 
religious activities of Yasukuni Shrine and the Gokoku Shrine” and they were subsequently 
considered a violation of Article 20 as well as Article 89. The second instance court 
overturned this ruling, arguing that although the offerings might be said to have religious 
meaning, “for common people, making offerings such as tamagushiryō when worshiping 
at shrines can—if not overly excessive—be accepted as social ritual.” Furthermore, the 
court argued that “the effect and influence of these actions on common people would not 
awaken any special concern or spirit to revive the legal status that Yasukuni Shrine had 
during World War II or to support and promote Shinto.” In short, the second instance court 
considered the sum of money to be too small to count as “support” and viewed the rites as 
“social ritual” rather than “religious activity,” meaning that the actions of the prefectural 
government were not prohibited under Articles 20 and 89.41
In the majority ruling on the Ehime case, the Supreme Court focused on Yasukuni 
Shrine’s status as a Religious Juridical Person—that is, as one of a large number of 
corporations equal before the law. Although Yasukuni Shrine has close ties to Jinja Honchō, 
it is not incorporated under this Comprehensive Religious Juridical Person. Rather, 
Yasukuni was established as an Individual Religious Juridical Person (tanritsu shūkyō hōjin 
単立宗教法人), under Shrine Shinto.42 The justices in the Ehime ruling retained many 
of the arguments from the Tsu groundbreaking case, including the idea that Article 20 
should be interpreted as promoting a position of religious neutrality for the state as well as 
39 Heisei 4 (gyō-tsu) 156, p. 1. Tamagushiryō is a special offering of branches of the evergreen sakaki tree with 
paper strips tied to them. Kentōryō are offerings dedicated specifically to funding the lanterns that are lit at 
shrines and temples during specific events, such as the Mitama Festival. The ceremony at the Gokoku Shrine 
was an irei taisai 慰霊大祭, a “great festival for the comfort of spirits.” The “modern” custom of festivals 
dedicated to spirits of the war dead (eirei 英霊, “heroic spirits”) goes back to 1862, when the leaders of the 
anti-shogunate forces requested that Emperor Kōmei sponsor a ritual for those soldiers who died during the 
campaign against the Tokugawa shogunate. The first irei no saigi 慰霊の祭儀 was conducted in Kyoto by 
Buddhist and Shinto priests. See Nelson 2003.
40 Dessì 2007, pp. 149–55.
41 Heisei 4 (gyō-tsu) 156, p. 2.
42 Bunkachō 2015, p. 2.
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the general outline of the purpose and effects standard, yet at the same time they sought 
to evaluate whether donations paid for using public funds would infringe the relationship 
between state and religion—this time interpreted as the relationship between the state and 
any Religious Juridical Person.43
Even though the justices acknowledged that some offerings at a shrine, such as 
throwing small coins before praying, might be considered cultural acts, the fact that the 
prefectural government chose to offer tamagushiryō at Yasukuni and kumotsuryō at the local 
Gokoku shrine would “give common people the impression that these religious groups were 
something different from other religious groups.” The justices interpreted Article 20 in light 
of the close relationship between Shinto and the state established during the Meiji period, 
and concluded that regardless of whether “a considerable number of people might wish for 
it,” the state is still not allowed to interact with a specific religious organization.44 Justice 
Ōno Masao 大野正男 also stressed the central role of Yasukuni Shrine in “State Shinto,” 
and stated that the argument that “shrines are not religion” is tied to the prewar ideology 
whereby Shinto rites and ceremonies were considered “secular customs” and therefore “duties 
of the subjects,” regardless of the subject’s individual creed. In concluding his statement, 
he wrote that “it is a fact that there are people in our society who have a sense of reverence 
with regards to Yasukuni Shrine, and this is something that is guaranteed by the freedom 
of religion.” However, in this case it was clear that “public organs had a special relationship 
with a specific religious organization,” and such a relationship was prohibited under the 
constitution.45
In concluding the Ehime ruling, the justices argued that the fact that the offerings paid 
to these shrines “could not escape their religious significance” meant that the prefectural 
government had overstepped the limits of the “cultural and social conditions of our 
country” as established in the Tsu framework, and that hence the actions were in violation 
of the Article 20 ban on “religious activity.” 46 In his review of the Supreme Court cases 
related to Articles 20 and 89, Frank Ravitch has called the Ehime ruling a “landmark case” 
that together with the Tsu case served to divide the postwar era into two distinct periods—
“Shinto as culture” from 1977 to 1997, and “Shinto as religion” following the Ehime ruling. 
Commenting on the new precedent set with the Ehime ruling, he writes that this was a “vast 
improvement” over the previous approach, not least since the Ehime justices “addressed the 
historical reasons for [their] decision going back to the problems created by State Shinto,” 
but also because the approach was “far more consistent with the actual language of Articles 
20 and 89” than was the previous Tsu precedent.47
1997 and Beyond: Is the Ehime Precedent Valid?
Since 1997, the Supreme Court has ruled on Articles 20 and 89 with regards to two sets of 
cases, but with quite different results. The first of these, with rulings presented in 2002 and 
2004, is a set of three similar cases related to the enthronement rites of the current emperor 
43 Heisei 4 (gyō-tsu) 156, pp. 4–5.
44 Heisei 4 (gyō-tsu) 156, pp. 6–7.
45 Heisei 4 (gyō-tsu) 156, pp. 14–16.
46 Heisei 4 (gyō-tsu) 156, p. 8.
47 Ravitch 2014, pp. 519–20.
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after the death of Hirohito 裕仁, the Shōwa emperor, in 1989.48 These rites, which took 
place between 1989 and 1990, contained many elements of Shinto and were the subject 
of much criticism from the more vocal minorities in Japan—in particular Christians, but 
also some Buddhists and others. Eventually the criticism of government sponsorship of the 
rites resulted in three court cases—which I will refer to as the Daijōsai cases—filed by local 
citizens in Ōita, Kagoshima, and Kanagawa Prefectures. The cases concern the visits made 
and offerings paid by their respective prefectural governors at the time of the enthronement 
of Akihito 明仁, the Heisei emperor, in 1990. It is important to note that the cases did not 
concern the constitutionality of the role of the emperor in these rites, but that they focused 
exclusively on the participation of public officials.
The rulings in these cases—those concerning the Ōita and Kagoshima prefectural 
governors served as precedents for the Kanagawa case two years later—were produced 
several years after the Ehime case, but contain no references to this case. Instead, they 
begin by offering the Tsu purpose and effects test as a framework for interpreting Articles 
20 and 89. Following this, the Ōita and Kagoshima rulings present a short discussion on 
the nature of the daijōsai 大嘗祭, in which the justices acknowledged that the rites included 
the emperor praying to and giving thanks to “the imperial ancestors and the gods of heaven 
and earth (tenjin chigi 天神地祇)” and that they were conducted “according to Shinto rites 
in a ritual space (saijō 斎場) with shrine (shinden 神殿) installations.” Although this meant 
that they clearly had some “connection to religion,” the justices concluded that they did 
not favor any one “specific religion.” Since the daijōsai were viewed as “traditional rites that 
commonly take place at the time of imperial succession,” participation in these rites should 
be considered “a social ritual to the emperor, symbol of the Japanese state and of the unity 
of the Japanese people.” Consequently, “in light of the social and cultural conditions of 
our country,” participation in the daijōsai rites did not go against the principles of Japanese 
secularism as stipulated in Articles 20 and 89.49
It is possible that the Daijōsai cases should be considered an anomaly in the post-
Ehime legal history in Japan. Frank Ravitch omits the cases from his review;50 Andrew B. 
Van Winkle, although summarizing the cases, suggests that they simply show the continued 
vitality of the purpose and effects test in Japan.51 It is also worth noting that three of the 
justices supporting the majority ruling in the Ehime case—Ijima Kazutomo 井嶋一友, Fujii 
Masao 藤井正雄, and Fukuda Hiroshi 福田博—took part in or presided over the petty 
benches ruling on two of the Daijōsai cases, while still referring back to the Tsu precedent 
in their interpretation of Articles 20 and 89 rather than to the Ehime ruling. Perhaps the 
best explanation for this can be found in the sensitive subject of the emperor, main actor of 
the ceremony. The justices in the Daijōsai cases—although not explicitly—do refer to those 
articles of the constitution which define the role of the emperor in the postwar Japanese 
state. Referring to the emperor as the “symbol of the Japanese state and of the unity of the 
Japanese people” relates directly to Article 1 of the constitution, and their descriptions of 
the daijōsai as traditional ceremonies (dentō gishiki 伝統儀式) support the constitutionality 
48 The three cases are Heisei 11 (gyō-tsu) 77, Heisei 11 (gyō-tsu) 93, and Heisei 14 (gyō-tsu) 279. For a more 
detailed discussion on the rites in question, see Breen and Teeuwen 2010, pp. 168–98.
49 Heisei 11 (gyō-tsu) 77, p. 1–3.
50 Ravitch 2014.
51 Van Winkle 2012, p. 377.
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of the claim by referring to Article 7:10.52 If anything, these three cases show the problems 
inherent in having a monarch ideologically rooted in the prewar Shinto order conducting 
ceremonial functions in the strictly secular society of postwar Japan.53 During the 
modernization process of the nineteenth century the emperor might have been transformed 
“from a deity ... in the pantheon whom people had traditionally manipulated, into the Deity 
endowed with sacredness and inviolability” who presided over the Japanese nation, yet it 
would seem that the emperor’s modern role retains much of its validity in postwar Japan, 
decades after the Shōwa emperor declared his humanity.54 
The rulings that would eventually cement the Ehime line of argument as legal 
precedent were handed down by the Supreme Court in January 2010, and concluded two 
cases that had been initiated by private citizens Taniuchi Sakae 谷内栄 and Takahashi 
Masayoshi 高橋政義 in 2004.55 The cases related to two shrines, the first to Sorachibuto 
Shrine 空知太神社 (“Sunagawa I”) and the second to Tomihira Shrine 富平神社 (“Sunagawa 
II”), and they had been initiated in 2004 after the two plaintiffs had tried for years to reach 
an out of court agreement with the local city council. The two shrines were constructed 
on government-owned land in the city of Sunagawa in Hokkaido, and the cases actually 
originate in the attempts made by the local Sunagawa city council to comply with Articles 
20 and 89. Tomihira Shrine had originally been erected by local citizens in 1894 as a small 
shrine dedicated to Ōkuninushi no Mikoto 大国主命 in order to pray for a good harvest. In 
1935, the land on which this shrine was located had been transferred from the local citizens 
to the city council to erect an apartment complex for teachers at the local school. The 
Sunagawa II case concerned the attempt by Sunagawa City Council in 2004 to transfer the 
shrine grounds back to local citizens. The transfer was conducted in 2005, when the shrine 
grounds were handed over as a grant to the Tomihira Neighborhood Association (chōnaikai 
町内会), on condition that the association also became responsible for the administration 
of the shrine. This was done, as the Supreme Court ruling makes clear, “in order to solve a 
situation where city-owned grounds were used as the site of the shrine.” 56
The Sunagawa I case is similar to the Sunagawa II case in that it concerns an attempt 
by the city of Sunagawa to relocate a shrine from public grounds. Sorachibuto Shrine was 
erected at around the same time as the Tomihira Shrine, with the oldest building—a small 
shrine (hokora 祠)—constructed in 1892 in order to pray for a bountiful harvest. In 1897, 
local citizens applied for the lease of land to build a larger shrine, and after gaining such a 
permit they erected a shrine dedicated to Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大御神. A few years later, 
52 It is interesting to note that the adjective used to describe the ceremonies has shifted to “traditional” in the 
Supreme Court ruling. In the lower instance court, which considered participation in the rites prohibited 
under the constitution via references to Ehime, the ceremonies were referred to as “religious ceremonies of the 
emperor” (tennō no shūkyō gishiki 天皇の宗教儀式). See the Fukuoka High Court ruling on the Ōita case for 
further details; Heisei 6 (gyō-ko) 12.
53 For details on the process of turning the Shōwa emperor into the constitutional head of state under the 
postwar constitution, see Dower 2000, chapters 9, 10, and 11.
54 Ohnuki-Tierney 2002, p. 89.
55 All documents detailing the plaintiffs’ side of this case were collected and published in 2013 under the 
title “Shiyūchi ni jinja wa iken!” Sunagawa seikyō bunri soshō no kiseki (Sōma 2013). My discussion on the 
motivations of the two plaintiffs is based partly on their own statements in this publication (pp. 28–41), and 
partly on interviews conducted with Taniuchi Sakae in June 2016. For an English-language discussion on the 
Sunagawa rulings, see Breen 2010.
56 Heisei 19 (gyō-tsu) 334, pp. 3–4.
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Sorachibuto Primary School was built 
on adjacent grounds, and when the 
school buildings were to be extended 
in the years after World War II, the 
need to relocate the shrine arose. In 
1950, Sorachibuto Shrine was relocated 
to neighboring lands belonging to a 
private citizen, but in an attempt to 
avoid paying tax for this land, the 
grounds were donated to the Sunagawa 
City Council in 1953. Although the 
maintenance of the shrine has been the 
responsibility of the local Sorachibuto 
Neighborhood Association, the grounds 
remained the property of the city 
council and were offered as the site of 
the shrine buildings without compensation.57
Taniuchi and Takahashi were Christian members of the same Presbyterian church in 
the city of Takigawa, and having both experienced the war they shared the concern that 
state patronage of Shinto shrines might lead to a return to the militaristic regime in which 
they grew up. Takahashi was a soldier in the Japanese army fighting in China and, after 
he returned from the war, fourteen years after leaving Japan at the age of twenty-one, he 
began reflecting critically on his own actions during the war. Before he became involved 
in the Sunagawa cases, Takahashi spent much of his spare time giving lectures about his 
experiences in China, speaking openly about not only the horrors he had seen but also about 
what he himself had done. Taniuchi, born in 1930, was too young to be drafted into the 
imperial army, but had been working in the military factories in Hokkaido. One of his older 
brothers had been fighting in Manchuria and was killed after the Japanese surrender, and his 
spirit was later enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine. After the war, Taniuchi became a Christian 
and for many years he was the chairman of the Association of War Bereaved Families 
Opposed to War and Praying for Peace (Heiwa o negai sensō ni hantai suru senbotsusha 
izoku no kai 平和を願い戦争に反対する戦没者遺族の会), formed as an alternative to the 
Nippon Izokukai by the bereaved who are opposed to state support for the cult of the war 
dead. Taniuchi and Takahashi considered the imperial Shinto of prewar Japan to have 
been a key factor contributing to the war, and their involvement in the Sunagawa case was 
rooted both in their ideology of pacifism and in their identity as members of a minority 
religion. Although Taniuchi and Takahashi were the only plaintiffs in the Sunagawa cases, 
it is important to note that they did have a substantial group of supporters, both locally and 
throughout Japan. Katō Masakatsu 加藤正勝, the minister of their congregation, states that 
many people informally backing the two plaintiffs were worried about their relationship to 
the local community, and that this was why only two senior citizens initiated the case.58
57 Heisei 19 (gyō-tsu) 260, pp. 3–5.
58 Sōma 2013, pp. 11–12.
Figure 4. Taniuchi Sakae, plaintiff in the Sunagawa cases, and 
the Reverend Katō Masakatsu at Tomihira Shrine. Photo by 
the author.
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Although the justices of the same grand bench reached different verdicts in the two 
cases—in Sunagawa II they deemed the acts of the city council constitutional, whereas 
in Sunagawa I they concluded that the acts were prohibited under Articles 20 and 89—
it is worth noting that both rulings are clear on the religious nature of the shrines. In the 
Sunagawa II ruling, the justices agreed that Tomihira Shrine and the festivals conducted 
there should be seen as having “religious functions,” but they argued that the neighborhood 
association responsible for the administration of the shrine was not to be considered a 
religious organization. In granting the neighborhood association the land, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the city council navigated between their obligation to uphold the 
religious freedom of the local parishioners (ujiko 氏子), which might have been infringed 
upon by the relocation of the shrine, and at the same time ensuring that the city did not 
own religious property. The purpose of the grant was not to support a specific religious 
organization, and the justices did not consider the effect of such a grant—based along Tsu 
lines of the “view of common people”—to be the promotion of a specific religion.59
In the Sunagawa I case, the court concluded that the buildings on the government 
land should be considered a Shinto shrine, and that the events taking place there contained 
too many elements of Shinto to consider them “simple secular events with a weak religious 
meaning.” The court then emphasized the fact that the group responsible for conducting 
these festivals was not the neighborhood association, but the local parishioners organized 
in an “ujiko group” (ujiko shūdan 氏子集団) under the neighborhood association. Because 
the primary purpose of this group was “religious activity,” the justices concluded that the 
group was a “religious institution or association” under Article 89 of the constitution. 
Consequently, in lending the land free of use to the neighborhood association and thereby 
the ujiko group, the Sunagawa City Council was in fact aiding one specific religion.60 An 
interesting aspect of this ruling is how the justices evaluated the options available to the city 
council, and essentially ruled on the city councilors’ inability to comply with Articles 20 
and 89 of the constitution.61
In the Sunagawa I ruling, the justices tasked the city council with finding an 
alternative solution that would better comply with Articles 20 and 89 of the constitution. 
Just days after the Supreme Court ruling, on 22 January 2010, members of the city 
council met with representatives for the ujiko group and the Sorachibuto Neighborhood 
Association in order to discuss such a solution. By 16 July, the city council announced that 
a compromise had been agreed upon, according to which the ujiko group would lease the 
patch of land on which the torii 鳥居 gate was located for a reasonable rent, and that the 
other shrine buildings would be relocated to this patch. This land would be enclosed by 
a rope, to make it clear that it was distinguished from the surrounding public grounds. 
Further measures included the removal of the name of the shrine from a public building on 
the grounds as well as changing the inscription on a stone monument from jijingū 地神宮 
(“shrine to kami of the land”) to kaitaku kinenhi 開拓記念碑 (“memorial stone for the 
clearing [of the land]”). All of the expenses involved would be covered by the shrine.62 Two 
59 Heisei 19 (gyō-tsu) 334, pp. 4–5.
60 Heisei 19 (gyō-tsu) 260, pp. 8–9.
61 Heisei 19 (gyō-tsu) 260, pp. 10–11.
62 Heisei 23 (gyō-tsu) 122, pp. 3–4.
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years after the Sunagawa I ruling, on 
16 February 2012, a minor bench of 
the Supreme Court, containing three 
justices from the 2010 grand bench, 
presented a ruling on an appeal that 
the measures agreed upon in July 
2010 would in fact benefit one specific 
religious group—the ujiko group 
responsible for the shrine—and that 
the implementation of these measures 
was therefore unconstitutional.63 The 
Supreme Court opted to dismiss this 
appeal, on grounds similar to the 
Sunagawa II ruling. Following the 
agreement of July 2010, the shrine 
had become the responsibi l ity of 
the ujiko group, and the justices considered the rent agreed upon for use of the land—
¥35,000 per year for the fifty-two square meters on which the shrine was now located—
to be a reasonable compromise between the religious freedom of the ujiko group and the 
disestablishment clause of the constitution. Without denying the religious nature of the 
shrine or of the festivals that might take place there, the justices argued that the measures 
implemented were substantial enough to ensure that, “in the eyes of the common people,” 
Shinto did not receive special privileges from the state.64 Like in the Sunagawa II case, the 
purpose and effects test proved its continued validity.
Revising the Constitution in Response to a New Paradigm
The postwar cases that have dealt with the question of whether Shinto should be considered 
a religion or not have one thing in common that is worth emphasizing: they all deal with 
Shinto actors or activities that have a connection to the state-sponsored Shinto of prewar 
Japan. Every case from Tsu to Sunagawa has been concerned either with the prewar cult 
of the war dead (the SDF Enshrinement case, the Minoo Memorial case, and the Ehime 
Tamagushiryō case) or, in the Daijōsai cases, the prewar idea of the emperor as Shinto-
oriented head of state. The two exceptions to this are the Tsu groundbreaking case, where 
the rites were conducted by priests from Ōichi Shrine, and the Sunagawa cases. In the 
case of Sunagawa I and II, the question at hand was never whether Shinto was a religion 
or not. However, while the cases mainly concerned how the city had chosen to deal with a 
property situation that was considered in violation of the constitution, the motivations of 
the plaintiffs Taniuchi and Takahashi were clearly related to the close relationship between 
Shinto and the state in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus despite the fact that the shrines were not 
strictly speaking part of the cult of the war dead, in the eyes of the plaintiffs there existed a 
clear connection between any Shinto shrines and the militarism of imperial Japan.
63 Justices Miyakawa Kōji 宮川光治, Sakurai Ryūko 櫻井龍子, and Kanetsuki Seishi 金築誠志.
64 Heisei 23 (gyō-tsu) 122, pp. 5–7.
Figure 5. Sorachibuto Shrine in June 2016. The enclosed patch 
of land is leased to the local ujiko group for an annual fee of 
¥35,000. Photo by the author.
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Since the ruling on the Ehime case in 1997, there have been a number of lower 
instance rulings that have involved shrines with prewar connections to the cult of the war 
dead. One such case is the 2004 ruling presented by the Fukuoka District Court regarding 
former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s first visit to Yasukuni Shrine during his time in 
office.65 Similar to the Supreme Court rulings discussed in this essay, the case was filed by 
plaintiffs representing a number of minority groups opposed to renewed ties between Shinto 
and the Japanese state, including families of war dead, Buddhists, Christians, and Zainichi 
Koreans. The three judges ruling on the case found Koizumi to be at fault, using the Ehime 
precedent to conclude that although “in the consciousness of common people, Shinto is not 
perceived to be a religion as much as other religions,” it was still “impossible to deny the 
religious meaning of Shinto” and therefore visits to Yasukuni in the official role of prime 
minister could not be tolerated.66 Despite the many attempts throughout the postwar era by 
the Nippon Izokukai and LDP politicians to renationalize Yasukuni Shrine, the most central 
shrine of the national cult of the war dead in prewar Japan remains a Religious Juridical 
Person.67
Matsui Shigenori has expressed doubts over whether it would be necessary to revise 
the postwar constitution, given that “almost every reform could be accomplished by 
means of constitutional interpretation.” 68 Before 1997 this was apparently the case with 
regards to state sponsorship of Shinto; through the prevalence of the paradigm of Shinto as 
something other than religion, public officials were at liberty to sponsor Shinto institutions 
openly without the risk of legal reprimands. The Ehime ruling was the first time that this 
paradigm was broken in the Supreme Court, and the rulings on the two Sunagawa cases 
in 2010 confirmed the Ehime view that Shinto—regardless of whether “common people” 
consider it a religion or not—must be put on equal terms with other religions. Those who 
have supported official patronage of Shinto-based rites and ceremonies on the assumption 
that these are not religious activities have clearly suffered a major setback over the last two 
decades, and those actors who have a vested interest in the continued public support of 
Shinto have had to find new ways of reaching this goal. Since constitutional interpretation 
is no longer an option, the only route open to proponents of closer state-Shinto relations 
is constitutional reform. The Kenpō1000 campaign to gather support for constitutional 
reform amongst shrine visitors can be seen as a result of this development.
According to Tsukada Hotaka, three factors contributed to the establishment of 
Nippon Kaigi in May 1997: the debates related to the imperial succession ceremonies, the 
defeat of the LDP in the 1993 election, and the ruling on the Ehime Tamagushiryō case 
earlier the same year.69 Through the Society for the Protection of Japan—one of the two 
organizations that in 1997 merged into one organization—Nippon Kaigi has a connection 
to the imperial system that is older than the organization itself. The Society for the 
65 For a more detailed review of these cases, se Breen 2011.
66 Heisei 13 (wa) 3932, p. 10. In the end, the claim by the plaintiffs that the Koizumi visits had interfered with 
their own constitutional rights was completely dismissed by the court, and therefore, despite it being ruled 
that visiting the shrine in the official role of prime minister was a violation of the constitution, there were no 
further legal ramifications for Koizumi himself.
67 Breen 2007.
68 Matsui 2011, p. 273.
69 Tsukada 2015, pp. 57–62. 
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Protection of Japan, originally formed in 1974 as a union of religious groups opposed to 
Sōka Gakkai 創価学会, participated actively in the debates preceding the implementation 
of the Era Name Law (Gengō hō 元号法) in 1979.70 In fact, in his recent book on Nippon 
Kaigi, Sugano Tamotsu has argued that the movement supporting the gengō system can be 
seen as the very origin of Nippon Kaigi.71 After the death of the Shōwa emperor in 1989, 
the inherent problems of the emperor’s close connections to Shinto even as he served as 
secular head of Japanese state again rose to the surface, in particular through the legal cases 
related to the public finances used in connection to the funeral and succession rites. Most of 
these cases had been filed soon after the Heisei emperor ascended the throne, and by 1997 
they had been resolved in the first instance courts and were being processed by the second 
instance courts. Although the Daijōsai cases would not be finally resolved until 2002 and 
2004, the role of the emperor in the postwar Japanese state was a topic for debate at the time 
of the establishment of Nippon Kaigi.
Nippon Kaigi, described by Tsukada as “currently the largest conservative joint 
movement in the country,” is an organization of people from a wide range of backgrounds 
with a few common goals.72 For instance, although the five-member advisory board 
of Nippon Kaigi includes Kitashirakawa Michihisa, representative of Jinja Honchō, 
Takatsukasa Naotake, head priest of the Ise Shrines, and Hattori Sadahiro, permanent 
advisor of the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership, the current president is Takubo 
Tadae 田久保忠衛, professor emeritus of international politics at Kyorin University. The 
organization’s own list of officials includes persons from religious and Shinto organizations, 
politicians, scholars, and businessmen. Although the members of the organization might 
have their internal differences, the central issues that keep this diverse group together are 
essentially three: the position of the emperor, the protection of Japan’s borders, and revision 
of the postwar constitution.73 On their homepage, Nippon Kaigi write with regards to the 
emperor that:
The hearts of the Japanese people, filled with love and respect for the imperial family, 
have remained unchanged through all ages.... The existence of the imperial family, 
unbroken through an eternal history of 125 generations, must be called a treasure, 
without parallel in the world, of which our nation should be proud. We Japanese have 
endeavored to create a nation embracing a sense of unity as one ethnicity with the 
imperial family at the center.74
70 Mizohata 2016. For further details on the involvement of Jinja Honchō and the Shinto Association of 
Spiritual Leadership in this process, see Breen 2010.
71 Sugano 2016, pp. 40–41. This view is supported by Nippon Kaigi, who on their homepage describe their 
progress from the founding of Nihon o Mamoru Kai in April 1974. Up until the establishment of the Era 
Name Law in June 1979 this progress was closely tied to the movement supporting this law. Nippon Kaigi 
2016c.
72 Tsukada 2015, p. 57.
73 The organization presents six goals on their homepage, but it can be argued that three of those are more or 
less related to the three key issues outlined above: reforming the education system to better support Japanese 
traditional values, fostering of world peace through active participation in peacekeeping operations, and the 
goal of friendship between nations based on mutual trust and benefit. Nippon Kaigi 2016b.
74 Nippon Kaigi 2016b.
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This statement can be read as a response to those who questioned the constitutionality of 
public support for the participation in the Daijōsai rituals. The emperor is far more than 
the secular symbol of the state envisioned by the Allied occupation authorities. He is the 
very center of Japanese homogeneity, a treasure that has kept the Japanese nation together 
throughout the ages. As both Tsukada and Sugano have argued, the imperial system is 
central to the ideology of Nippon Kaigi—influenced by the Jinja Honchō-sanctioned view 
of the emperor as a descendant of Amaterasu Ōmikami, the 125th emperor in a direct line.75 
As Isomae Jun’ichi has suggested, “modern Japanese society, presupposing the dichotomy of 
religion/secular, can be said to uphold the façade of a society endorsing freedom of religion, 
but as regards the god incarnate emperor at the apex of the state, this sphere called the 
secular again falls under the shadow of the religious.” 76
From the outset, Nippon Kaigi has been devoted to the issue of constitutional reform.77 
Soon after handing down the ruling on the Ehime Tamagushiryō case, Chief Justice 
Miyoshi Tōru 三好達, the sole justice to disagree completely with the majority ruling, 
retired from the Supreme Court and became the president of Nippon Kaigi, a position 
he held from 2000 until 2015.78 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Miyoshi argued that 
the majority decision was mistaken in its assumption that Yasukuni Shrine and the local 
Gokoku Shrine were religious sites. He emphasized the role of these shrines when mourning 
those who died for the nation as well as when consoling their spirits, arguing that although 
it was hard to say that “consoling spirits” was something completely different from religion, 
the wish to honor those who have fallen in battle for the nation and to console the families 
of the deceased is “a universal sentiment of human nature surpassing religion, religious 
sect, ethnicity, and nation.” Most importantly, because the spirits enshrined at the shrines 
were those of men who fell in service to the nation, venerating them is beyond the confines 
of any one religion.79 Justice Miyoshi argued for this position partly by referring to visits 
by Christian prime ministers like Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂 and Ōhira Masayoshi 大平正芳, 
but his key argument rested on the idea that to most people in Japan, paying respect to the 
deceased on days such as the Mitama Festival or obon お盆 is a common ritual “separate 
from belief in a specific religion.” 80
Venerating the emperor and paying respect to the heroic spirits (eirei 英霊) of those who 
gave their lives for the nation are, as far as Nippon Kaigi is concerned, the national duties of 
all Japanese citizens, and as such this should be reflected in the Japanese constitution. The 
75 Jinja Honchō is open about its view on the divine origins of the emperor. See for instance its short English-
language introduction to Shinto, Soul of Japan. Jinja Honchō 2013.
76 Isomae 2012, p. 187.
77 It should be mentioned that Nippon Kaigi is in no way unique in wanting to reform the postwar constitution. 
There have been numerous attempts at reform since the end of the American occupation, with the first being 
headed by LDP Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō 鳩山一郎 in 1955. In fact, were it not for the strict limits 
on constitutional reform stipulated in the constitution, with a two-thirds majority required in both Houses 
to initiate amendment, as well as for the persistent opposition to reform presented by the political left, there 
would have been ample opportunity throughout the postwar era for rewriting the constitution. See Matsui 
2011, pp. 257–73, and Boyd and Samuels 2005.
78 Since stepping down in 2015, he now holds the title of “honorary president” (meiyo kaichō 名誉会長).
79 Throughout his opinion, Justice Miyoshi refers to these spirits as kuni ni junjita hitobito no mitama 国に
殉じた人々の御霊, that is, “the spirits of people who sacrificed themselves (or ‘became martyrs’) for their 
country.”
80 Heisei 4 (gyō-tsu) 156, p. 39.
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Citizens’ Association for the Creation of a Constitution for Beautiful Japan was established 
as a workgroup by Nippon Kaigi in October 2014 and includes among its members Miyoshi 
Tōru as well as prominent members of a number of religious organizations, including 
Tanaka Tsunekiyo 田中恆清, President of Jinja Honchō, and Uchida Fumihiro 打田文博, 
Secretary General of the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership.81 The workgroup 
has yet to produce a draft on how they envision the new constitution, but it is clear that 
although revising Article 9 is a primary goal, there are other parts of the constitution that 
also necessitate reform. Among these we find a “separation of state and religion that has 
gone too far.” 82
Without access to Nippon Kaigi’s own draft for constitutional amendment it is 
impossible to know exactly how they propose to solve these issues, yet given the membership 
overlap between Nippon Kaigi and the LDP we might assume that their draft will not 
deviate much from the “Draft for revision of the Constitution of Japan” (Nihonkoku kenpō 
kaisei sōan 日本国憲法改正草案) published by the LDP in April 2012. In particular the 
proposed amendments to Articles 20 and 89 give us an idea on how the problems arising 
from the strict separation of religion and state could be averted. The text in the first two 
paragraphs of Article 20 is more or less identical to the current constitution, yet paragraph 3 
is slightly altered:
It is unacceptable for the state and the local governments as well as for other public 
organizations to conduct education or other religious activities for the benefit of a 
specific religion. However, that which does not surpass the confines of social ritual or 
manners and customs (shakaiteki girei mata wa shūzokuteki kōi 社会的儀礼又は習俗的
行為) is not affected by this restriction.83
The revised version of Article 89 further adds that:
Public money or other public property must not, with the exception of cases under 
the stipulations given in Article 20 Paragraph 3, be disbursed to or offered for the use, 
benefit, or support of organizations involved in religious activities or for [religious] 
organizations.84
It is difficult not to read these paragraphs as a direct response to the outcome of the Ehime 
Tamagushiryō case. The revised constitution offers a way past the post-Ehime paradigm of 
Shinto as one of “the religions,” and gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to interpret 
Shinto as that which lies within the confines of “social ritual,” “manners,” and “customs.”
Based on the central position of the emperor in Nippon Kaigi ideology, it is likely that 
their ideal for a revised constitution would also reflect this. Although the LDP draft from 
2012 does not attempt to increase the political power of the emperor in postwar Japanese 
society, two alterations to the text are worth noting. First, besides retaining his current 
81 Tsukada 2015, pp. 57–62.
82 Nippon Kaigi 2016b.
83 Jiyūminshutō 2012, p. 7.
84 Jiyūminshutō 2012, p. 22.
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role as “symbol of the State and of the unity of the People,” the draft would also make the 
emperor “the head of the Japanese state” (Nihonkoku no genshu 日本国の元首). Second, in 
line with the Era Name Law of 1979, a new article is added: “As determined by the law, 
the Era Name (gengō) shall be established at the time of succession to the imperial throne 
(kōi no keishō 皇位の継承).” 85 Both of these changes are in line with current Nippon Kaigi 
discourse on the emperor—as symbolic head of the state and a symbol of Japan’s unique 
traditions and heritage.
Following the success enjoyed by the LDP and its allies in the 2016 House of 
Councilors election, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō 安倍晋三—himself a member of 
Nippon Kaigi—is now closer than ever before to his goal of initiating constitutional 
reform. Although we do not yet know the extent to which the LDP will try to revise the 
constitution, it is likely that an attempt will be made to alter the language in Articles 20 and 
89 the better to allow for state patronage of Shinto. In January, Jinja Honchō made their 
stance public by participating in a campaign that seeks to establish a popular base for the 
general effort to revise the constitution. Although the Kenpō1000 campaign is rather vague 
on the specifics of the new constitution, considering that the campaign is tied to Nippon 
Kaigi—and hence to Jinja Honchō and to the ruling faction of the LDP—it can be assumed 
that these reforms will reflect current discourse within these organizations. Although media 
discussions are likely to focus mainly on the revision of Article 9, the fact that the Shinto 
establishment openly supports this process of constitutional reform suggests that we should 
also pay attention to the implications of a revised constitution for the relationship between 
Shinto and the state.
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